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Abstract
This review essay conducts and works to contribute an assessment of recent realist critiques of lib-
eral hegemony. It finds that realists identify important problems with liberal hegemony, but also finds
that under scrutiny the alternative foreign policies that realist critics offer suffer from their own se-
rious limitations. It makes the case that realist proposals of “restraint” and “offshore balancing”
avoid the problems realists associate with liberal interventionism, but would also be generative of
proxy wars, while offering insufficient additional institutions, practices, and norms for mitigating and
managing proxy wars and great power conflict, among other global and international challenges.
From closer examination and consideration, that is, the argument is made that these limitations of
alternative realist foreign policies question their ability to contribute to international order in the
twenty-first century and suggest, quite the opposite, that if pursued they would instead become new
sources of international disorder, albeit while avoiding some of the problems associated with liberal
internationalism.
Los límites del realismo después de la hegemonía liberal
Resumen
Este ensayo de revisión pretende aportar una evaluación de las recientes críticas realistas a la hege-
monía liberal. El informe concluye que los realistas identifican problemas significativos relacionados
con la hegemonía liberal, pero también descubre que, si se analizan, las políticas exteriores alter-
nativas que proponen los críticos realistas presentan sus propias limitaciones graves. Este trabajo
también afirma que las propuestas realistas de “moderación” y “equilibrio offshore” evitan los prob-
lemas que los realistas asocian con el intervencionismo liberal, pero también podrían generar guerras
por delegación, al tiempo que ofrecen instituciones, prácticas y normas adicionales insuficientes para
mitigar y gestionar las guerras por delegación y los conflictos de grandes potencias, entre otros de-
safíos globales e internacionales. A partir de un examen y una valoración a fondo, se argumenta
que estas limitaciones de las políticas exteriores realistas alternativas cuestionan su capacidad para
contribuir al orden internacional en el siglo XXI y, por el contrario, sugieren que, de llevarse a cabo,
si bien evitarían algunos de los problemas asociados al internacionalismo liberal, se convertirían en
nuevas fuentes de desorden internacional.
Limites du réalisme suite à l’hégémonie libérale
Résumé
Cet essai de synthèse procède et s’efforce de contribuer à une évaluation des critiques réalistes ré-
centes de l’hégémonie libérale. Il constate que les réalistes identifient d’importants problèmes liés à
l’hégémonie libérale, mais il constate également que si elles sont examinées demanière approfondie,
les politiques étrangères alternatives proposées par les critiques réalistes souffrent de leurs propres
limites sérieuses. Il plaide que les propositions réalistes de « retenue » et « d’offshore balancing »
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évitent les problèmes que les réalistes associent à l’interventionnisme, mais qu’elles seraient égale-
ment génératrices de guerres par procuration, car elles offrent des institutions, pratiques et normes
supplémentaires insuffisantes pour limiter et gérer les guerres par procuration et les conflits des
grandes puissances, entre autres défis globaux et internationaux. Après une réflexion et un exa-
men plus approfondis, l’argument est que ces limites des politiques étrangères réalistes alternatives
remettent en question leur capacité à contribuer à l’ordre international au XXIe siècle et suggèrent,
au contraire, que si elles sont poursuivies, elles deviendront plutôt de nouvelles sources de désordre
international, même si elles évitent certains des problèmes associés à l’internationalisme libéral.
Keywords: Liberal Hegemony, Realism, Proxy Wars, International Order, Balance of Power,
Palabras clave: Hegemonía liberal, realismo, guerras por delegación, orden internacional, equilibrio de poder,
Mots clés: hégémonie libérale, réalisme, guerres par procuration, ordre international, équilibre des puissances
Introduction
In this review essay, I conduct and work to contribute an
assessment of recent realist critiques of liberal hegemony.
I find that realists identify some important problems with
liberal hegemony, but also find that under scrutiny, the
alternative foreign policies that realist critics offer suf-
fer from their own serious limitations. I make the case
that realist proposals of “restraint” and “offshore bal-
ancing” avoid the problems realists associate with liberal
interventionism, but would also be generative of proxy
wars, while offering insufficient additional institutions,
practices, and norms for mitigating and managing proxy
wars and great power conflict among other global and in-
ternational challenges. From closer examination and con-
sideration, that is, I argue these limitations of alternative
realist foreign policies question their ability to contribute
to international order in the twenty-first century and sug-
gest, quite the opposite, that if pursued they would in-
stead become new sources of international disorder, al-
beit while avoiding some of the problems associated with
liberal internationalism.
Liberal Hegemony and Its Critics
“Liberal hegemony” was a policy to use the immense
power of the United States in the post–ColdWar world to
globalize a liberal international order, to promote democ-
racy and liberal principles, to build a free and open global
liberal economic order, and to expand multilateral in-
ternational institutions, with the backing of US power
(Ikenberry 2001). G. John Ikenberry, the world’s lead-
ing scholar of the liberal international order, explains
liberal hegemony as, “a distinctive type of liberal inter-
national order—a liberal hegemonic order. The United
States did not just encourage open and rule-based or-
der. It became the hegemonic organizer and manager of
that order”(Ikenberry 2011, 2–3).This liberal hegemonic
order, as such, implied special hegemonic management
responsibilities for the United States, as well as privileges
(Clark 2011). The decline and disruption of this liberal
hegemonic order in recent years has generated enormous
debate about the sources and depth of its disruption, as
well as controversy about how “liberal” and “orderly”
it ever was (Ikenberry 2018; Cooley and Nexon 2020;
Adler-Nissen and Zarakol 2021). In these debates, real-
ist critics have made the case that liberal hegemony it-
self is the source of much, if not all, of its own challenges
and crisis, in what they argue is essentially a realist world
(Mearsheimer 2018; Walt 2018; Porter 2020). Liberal
internationalism, realist critics claim, undermines hege-
monic power and generates international instability by
intensifying security dilemmas with illiberal powers and
squandering US power in costly norm-motivated inter-
ventions that foment nationalist and anti-American resis-
tance. Realists as such make a deep criticism that liberal
hegemony is the source of its own crisis and is inherently
self-defeating, so should be abandoned in favor of a thor-
oughly realist US-led order.
Three recent works articulate these realist criticisms
with particular intellectual force. John J. Mearsheimer’s
The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International
Realities (2018) offers a powerful critique of liberal
hegemony made in the author’s distinctively trenchant
and lucid style. This book’s first three chapters also
offer a meditation on political liberalism, in its domes-
tic application, as a political theory. These first three
chapters seem not entirely necessary to advance the
book’s core argument and stated “goal” to “describe
what happens when a powerful state pursues this strategy
[of liberal hegemony] at the expense of balance-of-power
politics” (Mearsheimer 2018, 1). Mearsheimer’s aim in
these early chapters is to scrutinize liberalism itself, in
order to consider why it struggles to be exported to
other countries without great cost and resistance. He
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political liberalism from a more radical and ambitious
“progressive” tradition, then posits nationalism and
the diversity of political cultures as forces that explain
some of the persistent challenges that liberalism en-
counters when exported. In chapters 6 and 7, the core
of Mearsheimer’s argument against liberal hegemony is
articulated and advanced, making the case that liberal
hegemony precipitates costly liberal norm-motivated
interventions and agitates counterbalancing in illiberal
powers. His final chapter outlines an alternative realist
foreign policy of “restraint.”
Mearsheimer’s argument, in sum, holds that liberal
foreign policy during an era of US hegemony has failed
to spread democracy or produce international stability
because it antagonized the forces of nationalism and re-
alist counter-hegemonic power politics, wherever liberal
ambitions have been pursued. Liberal ideals and am-
bitions, moreover, Mearsheimer argues, have generated
norm-based imperatives for military interventions as
well as diplomatic tensions and quarrels between liberal
democracies and non-democracies. For Mearsheimer,
and like-minded realist critics, “The costs of liberal hege-
mony begin with the endless wars a liberal state ends
up fighting to protect human rights and spread liberal
democracy around the world” (Mearsheimer 2018, 152).
This argument makes a particularly powerful critique be-
cause it goes beyond the evidence of the failures of liberal
interventions and numerous other challenges of liberal
foreign policy, to more crucially and fundamentally ar-
gue that the sources of those failures and challenges are
found in the impulses of liberal internationalism itself.
Joining this critique is Stephen M. Walt’s The Hell of
Good Intentions: America’s Foreign Policy Elite and the
Decline of the U.S. (2018). This book in comparison fo-
cuses more narrowly on the foreign policy record of “lib-
eral hegemony” since the end of the Cold War, offering
an immensely detailed, thorough, and thoughtful evalu-
ation. Chapter 1 revisits the foreign policy of Clinton,
Bush, and Obama, considering how each pursued iter-
ations of “liberal hegemony.” In Walt’s evaluation, the
results of this policy constitute a dismal failure, finding
limited success in democracy promotion abroad, after a
series of costly interventions, which he argues has only
contributed to the worsening of numerous global prob-
lems. In chapter 2, he makes the case that this policy of
liberal hegemony failed because the “utility of force”was
overestimated and that the counterbalancing it generated
in Russia and China was underestimated,while the possi-
bility of “social engineering” abroad was also misjudged.
The electoral success of Trump, Walt also suggests, can
be partly attributed to Trump’s critique of this foreign
policy’s failures, and Trump’s promise of a different ap-
proach, although Walt also suggests that when in office,
Trump’s inexperienced and confused foreign policy only
worsened US foreign policy challenges. Focusing his anal-
ysis on liberal hegemony, however, the puzzle for Walt
is why liberal hegemony persisted in foreign policy, if it
contributed to its own crisis. Why did the three consec-
utive presidents before Trump pursue this foreign policy,
despite its limitations and recurrent setbacks? The idea
Walt offers in his remaining chapters is the existence of
a sclerotic foreign policy elite, “the blob.” He suggests
furthermore that a lack of accountability has been a key
factor in the perpetuation of the blob itself, before he con-
cludes the book with a proposal for an alternative realist
foreign policy of “offshore balancing.”
Walt’s critique, like Mearsheimer’s, makes a deep crit-
icism of liberal hegemony, that liberal hegemony has
failed because it overestimated the effectiveness of in-
terventionism and ability of US power to reshape other
states, while it also unintentionally intensified security
anxieties and balancing in Russia and China. For Walt,
“liberal hegemony rested on a distorted understanding
of international politics, which led its proponents to ex-
aggerate its expected benefits and underestimate the re-
sistance the United States would generate while pursuing
it” (Walt 2018, 69). The essence of the story that realist
critics are conveying here is that liberal internationalist
policies have not only struggled to address foreign policy
challenges, but that they themselves have generated them
as they have encountered the realities of power politics
and limits of their ideals in disastrous foreign campaigns
and agitation of resurgent illiberal powers. This is a dam-
aging critique because it goes beyond the evident failures
of liberal interventionism and limits of democracy pro-
motion in recent decades, placing the sources of these
challenges facing liberal hegemony on its own “liberal”
character.
Published two years after these books above, Patrick
Porter’s False Promise of Liberal Order: Nostalgia,
Delusion, and the Rise of Trump (2020) includes similar
critiques of liberal hegemony, while also offering caution
against the perils of temptations to “restore” a so-called
liberal international order. Porter makes the point that it
is not entirely accurate and rather misleading to suggest
that the US-led order was “liberal”, without including in
its history the role of coercive US power in making and
enforcing that order. In chapter 2, “Darkness Visible:
World-Ordering in Practice,” Porter gathers evidence of
the order’s illiberal features, including the use of force
in democracy promotion, from Vietnam to the War
on Terror, hypocritical claims to special privileges and
rule-breaking by the United States, and uneven trade
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economic order. This is ample evidence, although some-
what lacking in evidence of the coercion of democracies
within the liberal “club.” The reason Porter offers for
why it is perilous to attempt to “restore” a liberal order
is not that it would require the use of unduly coercive
levers, however, but rather that, as Mearsheimer and
Walt have also argued, liberal hegemony is a major
source of its own crisis. Restoring it would only worsen
its crisis, Porter suggests. In chapter 3, Porter argues that
the electoral victory of the Trump campaign and several
of his key policies were made possible by the failures of
liberal internationalist foreign policy. Replacing Trump,
with restored liberal internationalism, as Biden has
sought to do, Porter argues, only restores the sources of
instability that manifest in emergence of Trump in US
politics. Porter’s final chapter advances an alternative
foreign policy finding a middle ground between isola-
tionism and military overstretch. The strategic aims,
Porter (2020, 184) suggests, are for the United States to,
“contain a rising China, to divide China and Russia, and
to reduce its footprint in the Middle East”. To achieve
these aims, Porter (2020, 184) argues, “will require
Washington to make bargains with illiberal powers.”
Porter is clear furthermore that these bargains will likely
require unsavory aspects, as were the bargains made
with illiberal powers such as China in the Cold War era.
For Porter, like Mearsheimer and Walt, the key point
is that the project of liberal hegemony has been the source
of its own crisis, underestimating the security dilem-
mas it generated with illiberal states, namely Russia and
China. The emergence of counter-hegemonic balancing
by illiberal powers, Porter argues, is an expected out-
come of liberal hegemony in a realist world. According to
Porter’s analysis, moreover, the “liberal” hegemonic or-
der was not entirely based on a buy-in logic of liberal in-
ternational institutions, as liberal theorists have claimed.
Rather, Porter suggests it was based more simply on US
hegemonic power and ultimately its coercive use in ap-
plication. For Porter,
Ordering the world requires that others be led, and,
if not responsive to coaxing, more forcibly herded…
The liberal order proposition, supposed to help de-
velop trust and mitigate the forces of anarchy, under-
estimates the problem of the security dilemma, the
paradox of taking steps to increase security only to
heighten insecurity. Even the most well-intended, be-
nign project to order the planet will appear hostile and
threatening to rivals and potential adversaries. (Porter
2020, 22)
For Porter, liberal hegemony is a self-contradiction,
because of the requirement of applying coercive power
to build and maintain hegemonic order, and because the
“liberal” ambitions and demands of that power intensi-
fies security dilemmas, worsening international stability
and precipitating counter-hegemonic balancing behavior
in Russia and China.
These realist critiques leveled against liberal hege-
mony hit on important problems, where liberal hege-
mony has found its limits in world politics, particularly in
the limits of democracy promotion, the costly and disillu-
sioning misadventures of liberal interventionism, and in
the antagonized security dilemmas between liberal and
illiberal powers that it has contributed to. In response
to the challenges facing the liberal international order
project today, Ikenberry’s A World Safe for Democracy:
Liberal Internationalism and the Crisis of Global Order
(2020) offers a magisterial study of the trials of liberal
internationalism in international history, from the era of
liberal Enlightenment thinking and the Atlantic revolu-
tions to the twenty-first century, searching for lessons
for current times. “This book is centrally preoccupied”
he explains, “with the historical moments when liberals
have lost -and then found- their way” (Ikenberry 2020,
xv). Importantly, he suggests, for liberal internationalism
to find its way again today, it needs to revive a more
pragmatic, agonistic, and less triumphalist form of lib-
eralism. Ikenberry’s argument as such is not so much
an engagement or rebuttal of the critics of liberal inter-
nationalism (although he offers some counterargumen-
tation), as it is a reconsideration of the liberal interna-
tionalist project, through an examination of how it has
grappled with modernity in the past and how it might
better cope with its challenges today. His style of argu-
ment, staunchly defending the values, principles, and ide-
als of liberal internationalism, but deliveredwithout Kan-
tian universalism, and with a sense of liberalism within
history—in such phrases as liberalism’s “anticipations of
modernity as a continuously unfolding world-historical
drama” (Ikenberry 2020, 65)—gives this text a clas-
sic quality that almost fits in alongside the other clas-
sics of liberal international thought that it studies and
revisits. Ikenberry claims his book “is not written as
a battle between ‘realism’ and ‘liberalism’ (Ikenberry
2020, xiii), but he does engage realist critics.” He in-
sists that, “Liberal internationalism, as a project for orga-
nizing and reforming international relations, is uniquely
able to respond to the perils and opportunities of ris-
ing economic and security interdependence” (Ikenberry
2020, 12). This claim can be read to suggest that a
purely realist foreign policy may help navigate the bal-
ance of power but would do little to manage the other
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Ikenberry makes his case firstly by revisiting early lib-
eral modernity and its Enlightenment thought. He sug-
gests that liberal internationalism is a collection of prin-
ciples for ordering and safeguarding liberal democracies,
including openness and trade, loosely rules-based insti-
tutions, liberal democratic solidarity, cooperative secu-
rity, and progressive social purposes (Ikenberry 2020,
33–42). He then proceeds to explore how liberal interna-
tional orders have assembled these elements in different
ways, from the nineteenth century, and later Wilsonian
and Rooseveltian liberal internationalisms, to the rise of
liberal hegemony, which he dates from 1945. He then en-
gages the liberal empire debate against the allegedly in-
herent imperialism and interventionist impulses of liberal
internationalism. To explain liberalism’s history of asso-
ciation with illiberal tendencies, Ikenberry argues,
The most telling critique of liberal internationalism is
not its urge for empire or tendency to pursue coer-
cive regime change. It is the opposite: that liberal in-
ternationalism is too often weak and easily co-opted
by other agendas. (Ikenberry 2020, 254)
For Ikenberry, liberalism is not the source of the prob-
lems its critics identify, but rather it is its weakness re-
quiring combination with other forces that has driven
liberal internationalism toward imperial tendencies. Be-
cause of its weaknesses, liberal internationalism, “needs
to tie itself to great powers, capitalist systems, and hege-
monic projects,” that produce and manifest the alleged
ills of liberalism (Ikenberry 2020, 23–24). His final two
chapters address the current crisis and road ahead. He
suggests, fairly, that liberal internationalism has always
been an evolving and imperfect response to the challenges
of modernity. As such, it should not be unexpected for
challenges to exist, even in the best of times. And, as it
faces today’s challenges, he suggests, liberal internation-
alism will continue to evolve and adapt, as a global po-
litical project. In fairness, liberal internationalism is not
without achievements in managing modernity, but it has
suffered and perpetuated serious limitations too, as its
critics suggest and Ikenberry in places seems to confess
or concede. In this respect, at least, liberal internation-
alism should be given credit for both its successes and
failures.
In his study, Ikenberry acknowledges the post–Cold
War hegemonic liberal international order has suffered
limitations and suggests modifications. He recognizes
that free trade has generated destabilizing inequality in
developed democracies, while contributing to the rise of
an illiberal challenger in China. He recognizes, further-
more, that the rise of authoritarian China has posed a
new and serious challenge not only to US hegemony,
but also to liberal modernity, by fielding a new alterna-
tive authoritarian-capitalist vision of modernity in world
politics. In response, Ikenberry calls for a collection of
modifications to the liberal international order project.
He suggests that a renewed domestic policy is needed to
manage the more severe effects of capitalism at home.
Internationally, he suggests that the club of developed
democracies should regroup, with US leadership, to pro-
tect democracy and liberal principles in international so-
ciety, while being more careful and cautious when engag-
ing in free trade, searching for ways to better manage
its domestic and international effects. The liberal inter-
national order project, for Ikenberry, can be corrected,
by working to set the developed democracies in order
domestically, and by defensively protecting democracies
abroad, while striving to maintain and develop a func-
tional global international order in which all powers have
a stake.
In practice, the Biden administration has to some ex-
tent begun to initiate and implement these kinds of pro-
posed modifications. It has committed to greater do-
mestic investment for instance and sought to carve out
a foreign policy to revive and advance strategic cohe-
sion among democracies, while committing to ending the
“forever wars.” The depth of realist critiques suggests,
however, that anymodifications will be unsatisfactory for
realists. “There is no such thing as a good liberal hege-
mony,” the realist critic Stephen Walt has suggested, for
instance (Walt 2020). The logic of realist critiques sug-
gests that modifying liberal hegemony as Ikenberry has
argued for and the Biden administration has begun to im-
plement, both on the domestic and foreign policy fronts,
will do little to address the norm-motivated impulses it
generates toward costly interventions,while further exac-
erbating security tensions between democracies and non-
democracies. In particular, Biden’s search for deeper sol-
idarity among democracies will produce greater tensions
with illiberal powers, realists will argue. Ikenberry ar-
gues interventionist tendencies are not inherent to lib-
eralism, but realist critics make this a key premise of
their arguments. Crucially, realist critics also maintain
a higher threshold for using US forces in interventions
and instead recommend using the forces of US allies
and partners more heavily. Realist critics, among others,
have maintained that the United States is overly “forward
deployed.”1 This criticism is not entirely persuasive firstly
because in practice the Biden administration has commit-
ted to withdraw from Afghanistan, and secondly because
in principle liberal internationalism does not necessarily
1 For an excellent history of the rise of US military
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require US forces to be as “forward deployed” as they
have been. This is a strategy sometimes referred to as
“divested hegemony,” to describe the strategy of limiting
and selectively stationing US force deployment (Kitchen
2020). Liberal internationalism also at least in theory of-
fers means for developing conditions in which reducing
the numbers of forward deployed forces would be fea-
sible, by making investments in stabilizing international
institutions.
These points of disagreement between liberal interna-
tionalists and their realist critics may be at the level of as-
sumptions. There is nevertheless also a sense that in the
realists’ frustration with US foreign policymakers, they
have laid too much blame for foreign policy challenges
on liberal foreign policy elite thinking. Realists critics,
Mearsheimer and Walt most persistently, have focused
their criticisms on “the blob”, which they claim has cap-
tured US foreign policy thinking, and which they argue
is the ultimate source of misguided liberal foreign policy.
For realists, continuities between the Obama and Biden
administrations, even with policy modifications, is evi-
dence for the existence and effects of the “blob,” Yet,
the Trump administration sought to make a break from
the “blob,” but its policies were in several respects not
entirely distinct from previous administrations. This sug-
gests there are other factors shaping continuities, as much
if not more than dogmas of foreign policy thinking. Fur-
thermore, although Washington elites may have insider
status and interests, they also reside in and arise from a
broader liberal society that has produced several genera-
tions of liberal foreign policy practitioners and thinkers.
The United States itself, moreover, exists within a larger
collection of liberal states, where initiative for liberal in-
tervention also has found its sources, with Canada’s ad-
vocacy of R2P, for example. Even if liberal foreign pol-
icy thinking has dominated US foreign policy elites, there
are broader domestic and international factors to explain
why, beyond the existence of a “blob.”
This point should be stressed. While the amount of
blame that realist critics place on liberal internationalism
gives their critiques a quasi-polemical powerful impact,
by attacking liberal internationalism root and branch,
the amount of blame they place on liberal internation-
alism is too much to sustain the entirety of their argu-
ments. As reviews of realist arguments elsewhere have
noted, although it can be readily accepted that liberal
foreign policy orthodoxies surely matter as a source of
costly US interventionism, for instance, realist critics un-
derplay how external factors mattered too, including the
sheer imbalance of power afforded to the United States
in recent decades, and the exogenous shock of 9/11 re-
sulting in the war on terror (Bellamy 2019; Jervis 2020).
International factors such as these suggest realists have
placed too much causal weight on the role of liberalism
inside the state. Both the sources of US foreign policy and
its limits and challenges require a larger explanation in-
volving a number of other crucial factors, both domestic
and international. This is not to say that realists have not
made uninsightful critiques of the flaws and dangers of
liberal hegemony, only that they have been unduly fo-
cused on liberal internationalism, in their attribution of
a wide range of complex problems and challenges.
The Limits of Realist Policy Alternatives
Regardless of any analytical limitations of their critiques,
however, the pragmatically more significant shortcoming
of realist critiques is their struggle to offer more promis-
ing alternative paths to international order. Although
realist critics identify important problems with liberal
hegemony, what of the alternative international order
strategies they offer? Are defenders of a US-led “liberal”
international order project right that despite its flaws it
is still nevertheless the best international order strategy
among bad options, if modifications are made? While
the critiques leveled by realists may identify important
problems and make some damaging points, the alterna-
tive policy proposals they offer suffer from their own
serious limitations, when scrutinized. From closer exam-
ination and consideration, that is, these limitations of
alternative realist foreign policies questions their ability
to contribute to international order in the twenty-first
century and suggest, quite the opposite, that if pursued
they would instead become new sources of international
disorder, albeit while avoiding some of the problems
associated with liberal internationalism.
Realist critics have offered variations on balance of
power foreign policy proposals, suggesting that the de-
ployment and use of US forces should be restricted to
only vital US interests, while abandoning ambitions of
democratizing other states.Mearsheimer andWalt in par-
ticular make cases for “restraint” and “offshore balanc-
ing,” meaning a reservation of the use of force to the
most serious threats to US power, coupled with a pol-
icy to prevent China’s assumption of regional hegemony
in Asia (Mearsheimer and Walt 2016). Mearsheimer ex-
plains that when following a realist policy of restraint,
there are only a limited number of regions where
[the US] should be willing to risk a war. Those places
include the great power’s own neighbourhood and
distant areas that are either home to another great
power or the site of a critically important resource.
For the United States, three regions outside the
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today: Europe and East Asia, because that is where
the other great powers are located; and the Persian
Gulf, because it is the main source of an exceptionally
important resource, oil. (Mearsheimer 2018, 222)
Mearsheimer argues this more strategically “re-
strained” policy will better manage the balance of power,
reduce the amount of wars by eliminating liberal inter-
ventionism, and improve great power diplomatic rela-
tions by easing liberal antagonism of non-democracies.
Walt likewise strongly argues for realist foreign policy
of “offshore balancing”, meaning a deployment of US
forces only where necessary, while more heavily relying
on allies and strategic partners to balance regional chal-
lengers and Russia and China. Walt provides a clear de-
scription of this policy and its logic, worth quoting at
length, to fairly convey its contents:
Under a strategy of offshore balancing, the proper role
and size of the U.S. national security establishment de-
pends on the distribution of power in the key regions.
If there is no potential hegemon in sight in Europe,
Northeast Asia, or the Gulf, there is little reason to
deploy U.S. ground or air forces there and little need
for a national security establishment that dwarfs those
of the major powers.
If a potential hegemon does appear, the United States
should turn to local forces as the first line of defense.
It should expect them to uphold the regional balance
of power out of their own self-interest and to deal
with local security challenges themselves.Washington
might provide material assistance and pledge to sup-
port certain regional powers if they were in danger of
being conquered, but it should refrain from deploying
significant U.S. forces under most conditions…
In essence, this strategy aims to keep U.S. forces “off-
shore” for as long as possible while recognizing that
sometimes the United States will have to come on-
shore even before a conflict starts. If that happens, the
United States should get its allies in the region to do as
much of the heavy lifting as possible and go back off-
shore once the threat has been defeated. (Walt 2018,
262–63)
The realist foreign policy alternative of “offshore bal-
ancing” aims to balance against potential hegemons in
overseas regions, but with emphasis on using US al-
lies to invest in that balancing. The benefits of this
policy, Walt argues, are partly that it reduces costs by
requiring allies to contribute more, but more impor-
tantly that it preserves US power by managing its de-
ployment and avoiding costly interventions with US
forces.
Compared to a policy of liberal hegemony that has
been troubled by costly military interventions, these re-
alist policy alternatives on a superficial reading appear
sensible and even peace-loving, because they advocate re-
stricting intervention to a much higher threshold con-
dition of defending vital security interests. Yet, under
scrutiny, these realist policy proposals suffer from two
key limitations that ultimately question their ability to
contribute to international order in the twenty-first cen-
tury and suggest that if pursued they would instead
become new sources of international disorder (McKeil
2021), even if they avoided the problems associated
with liberal interventionism. Firstly, and most troubling,
is the likelihood that realist policy alternatives would
contribute to proxy wars between the great powers in
strategic regions. That is, a realist policy of restraint
and offshore balancing means less US-led intervention-
ism, but an equal amount and plausibly more proxy
wars, where the United States would seek to defend its
strategic interests indirectly. In fairness to realist policies,
they prudently cede key states neighboring Russia and
China, such as Ukraine and Myanmar, thereby avoid-
ing proxy wars in such strategically sensitive territories
(Mearsheimer 2014). It is nevertheless concerning, how-
ever, that realist proposals for “restraint” and “offshore
balancing” do not offer a genuine foreign policy alterna-
tive for crises such as Syria, where both the Obama and
Trump administrations have already sought to avoid di-
rect intervention, by waging protracted a proxy war with
regional consequences and casualties in the hundreds
of thousands. The costs and dramatically circumscribed
successes of interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well
as Libya, have already made it an increasingly common-
sense belief that direct interventions are infeasible, even
misguided, but this has suggested to many that therefore
more use of proxies is the only feasible policy option
for certain crises. The literature on proxy wars suggests
that states engage in proxy wars when their interests are
perceived to be threatened, but direct intervention with
their own forces is also perceived to be too high-risk or
too costly (Groh 2019, 8). Proxy wars are “war on the
cheap” and they have the advantage of reducing poten-
tial escalation to direct great power conflict and nuclear
war at the highest and last stage of escalation. A pol-
icy of restraint as such follows the perception that use
of US forces in small wars is too costly and too high-risk
where great powers may come into direct conflict. Yet, by
increasing this threshold for intervention, realist policy
alternatives decrease the threshold at which the United
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against assumptive hegemons, or to suppress terrorist
groups, or secure vital resources.
Let me unpack these points further. A degree of skep-
ticism is warranted about the extent to which realist
policies of restraint and offshore balancing would be
conducive to international order, and not a series of pro-
tracted proxy wars. As a recent study on proxy wars
notes, “If the United States does less, it must rely on oth-
ers to do more” (Berman and Lake 2019, 3). Inversely,
however, if the United States does less, its proxies must
also rely on the United States for more support, and when
allies and partners engage in conflict for their own inter-
ests, for instance, they likely will call for support in terms
of kit, including heavy arms, finance, training, and per-
haps air support, even while US “boots on the ground”
are denied. Where crises emerge and allies and strategic
partners become unstable or engaged in a local or re-
gional conflict, a realist-guided US foreign policy would
be inclined to support US partners and allies as proxies
for US forces. Because the use of US forces would have a
higher threshold, but because realists also advise main-
taining the material balance of power, a realist-guided
US foreign policy would become more easily persuaded
to engage in proxy wars. Furthermore, because it is a
“cheap”way to balance, the United States could engage a
wide number of proxy wars simultaneously, almost indef-
initely. This strategic environment would also tempt the
United States to trap Russian or Chinese forces in costly
protracted wars against US proxies, along the model of
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, as a strategy to drain the
power of China and Russia and limit their ability to en-
gage in other conflicts.
The potential for a wide number of proxy wars could
potentially condemn the twenty-first century to the mis-
eries and suffering of a series of protracted proxy wars
waged with ever-more sophisticated weapons technol-
ogy. Proxy wars are an immense source of international
disorder because they tend to be protracted, devastat-
ing the countries in which they are waged. They are
also generative of regional consequences including hu-
manitarian and refugee crises, as well as new military
groups operating across borders, whose long-term align-
ment with the United States is not always ensured. The
Syrian civil war, for example, evolved into a proxy war
with immense loss of life and consequences for regional
stability (Hughes 2014). It involved embedding of US
forces in proxy forces against Russian-supported gov-
ernment forces. At the same time, the diminishing pres-
ence of the United States in the region and inconsis-
tent US support for key partners has been a critical
contributor to the intensity, duration, and regional in-
volvement in the Syrian conflict (Phillips 2020). Real-
ists rightly suggest diplomacy is required to unwind the
conflict in Syria, yet, where the United States withdraws
its presence, as realist policies advise, proxy wars will
tend to continue and emerge without diplomatic break-
throughs, which require years to develop, achieve, and
implement.
Realist thinkers foresee as an emerging “bounded
order”, divided between China and the United States
(Mearsheimer 2019). A bounded order pocketed by a se-
ries of proxy wars is not unimaginable and well within
the realist vision of the emerging twenty-first century. The
conditions of potential nuclear war and the global scope
of the struggle made proxy warfare a common ingredient
of the Cold War. A realist policy of US restraint and off-
shore balancing without sufficient additional measures
to develop a stable international order likely would con-
tribute to a series of proxy wars between the great powers
seeking to support their partners and defend their vital
interests through proxy forces in key regions. The fight-
ing itself would invariably differ from that of the Cold
War with state and nonstate proxies likely being mixed
with use of remote weapons and cyber war, for instance
(Innes 2012; Krieg and Rickli 2019). The ideological con-
test between the great powers will also instead likely be-
come increasingly geo-cultural and geo-civilizational, not
simply geostrategic or purely geopolitical (Coker 2019;
Acharya 2020). But the conditions of security competi-
tion, high risks of direct conflict, lower costs of proxy
warfare, and realist proposals for doctrines limiting the
use of US forces with little other institutional measures
for managing conflict likely would precipitate protracted
proxy wars where conflicts emerge. Proxy wars, more-
over, are an international activity with virtually no inter-
national rules beyond those applying to the conduct of
war in general.
This assessment of realist foreign policy proposals
suggests that additional policy measures are required for
developing a stable international order, to avoid proxy
wars where possible and to contain and resolve them
when they do emerge, in addition to further global chal-
lenges. Realists are not opposed to the use of diplomacy
to avoid and manage conflict. To the contrary, they en-
courage it, but in encouraging the use of diplomacy it is
crucial to recognize that diplomacy also requires the sup-
port of international institutions and established diplo-
matic networks. Diplomatic breakthroughs are difficult
to achieve, requiring years of skillful and patient negoti-
ations. Diplomacy, moreover, is an inconstant and lim-
ited tool without the support of broader international
institutions that provide mechanisms of delay, ongoing
networks of collaborative great power pressure on bel-
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and agreed terms of dispute resolution, negotiation, and
mediation.
Realist critics of liberal hegemony often suggest
policy-fuzzy gestures toward diplomacy and accommo-
dation. Porter for instance argues that the United States
should abandon liberal hegemony in favor of détente-
style collaboration with illiberal powers in the making
of global order (Porter 2020, 170–99). The key strategic
proposal Porter advances is to
attempt a settlement with Russia with significant mu-
tual concessions, including sacrificing the interests of
non-NATO countries on its eastern flank, in order to
ease the growing sense of mutual threat. To facilitate
negotiations, the USA should revive government-to-
government dialogue to reach a new bargain. (Porter
2020, 187)
This is a strategy to ease pressure on Russia, in
the hopes of encouraging tensions between Russia and
China, which Porter proposes to combine with a reduc-
tion of forces in the Middle East, and a containment
strategy against China in Asia, by cultivating regional
strategic partners. This proposal in the abstract sounds
promising and genuinely contains helpful strategic
thought, but does not propose sufficient measures to
produce a lasting and stable order, and crucially requires
the willingness to collaborate from Russia, which Porter
admits is not guaranteed to be forthcoming (Porter 2020,
188). There is surely more needed for the construction
of a stable and lasting order between the United States
and China than a containment balancing strategy, even if
it were successful in dividing Russia from China. Where
the first proxy war between the United States and China
would emerge can only be speculated. China, like the
United States, has the capacity to wage indirect warfare,
incentives to avoid direct conflict, and experience from
the Cold War.
This as such poses a second limitation of realist
policy alternatives; they are insufficiently ambitious in
developing new and revised ordering of international
institutions and take for granted the role of deeper
primary institutions in producing international order
(Mearsheimer 1994–1995).2 With limited confidence in
the use of international institutions, realists struggle to
provide a substantive and sufficient strategy for pro-
ducing international order. Realists do acknowledge the
importance of major institutions such as the United Na-
tions or World Trade Organization for providing general
2 In this discussion, I define international institutions both
narrowly as regulative organizations and broadly as bun-
dles of constitutive and patterning rules and norms.
“rules of the road” that clarify expectations among states
(Mearsheimer 2018, 131; Walt 2018, 71). Yet, realists of-
fer no suggestions for reforming these institutions for cur-
rent challenges, nor do they see much promise in develop-
ing new institutions, and ultimately claim international
institutions are ineffective because they have “no coer-
cive leverage over states” in a context where states in an-
archy find themselves in security competition precipitat-
ing conflict (Mearsheimer 2018, 131). As Mearsheimer
states, “The nub of the dispute between liberals and real-
ists regarding both institutions and economic interdepen-
dence has to do with whether they promote world peace.
Liberals believe they ameliorate conflict; realists do not”
(Mearsheimer 2018, 143).Walt provides a clear explana-
tion of the realist lack of confidence in institutions where
he states,
As multilateral organizations such as NATO, the
World Bank, or the World Trade Organization have
shown repeatedly, international institutions can facil-
itate cooperation when states have clear and obvi-
ous incentives to work together, but they cannot stop
powerful states from acting as they wish and thus can-
not remove the danger of conflict and war. Interna-
tional institutions are simply a tool that states use to
advance their interests, and they inevitably reflect the
interests of the most powerful states. (Walt 2018, 71)
Because institutions lack an ability to coerce great
powers, realists claim, they have little to no impact on
conflict between great powers that arises as a result of
security competition.
Because of this lack of realist confidence in institu-
tions, Walt and leading economist Dani Rodrick have
instead advanced a global order proposal for construct-
ing a collection of select global “meta-norms” as conflict
avoidance and resolution mechanisms at a global level
(Rodrik and Walt 2021). This proposal is important and
in the right direction, as a needed element of building
shared global order, but it is also a thin set of meta-norms,
highly modest and limited in their order-making capac-
ities and ambitions. The proposal does not include inte-
grative institutions to formalize and embed meta-norms,
nor does it provide inclusive principles to legitimate those
meta-norms beyond the imperative to avoid direct great
power conflict.Walt and Rodrick, moreover, suggest that
their international order proposal exists within an emerg-
ing “bounded order” marked by proxy wars, and con-
cede their meta-norms do little to help mitigate or re-
solve proxy wars, focusing more on avoiding direct great
power conflict (Rodrik and Walt 2021, 20).
In modern international history, the international
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and error process—surely encountering new and unan-
ticipated forms of disorder along the way as well as
old ones—but nonetheless in a learning process of
gradually broadened and deepened institutions that
today realists themselves acknowledge as important. The
decline of the liberal hegemonic order project invites
new ideas for adapting international organizations and
ordering practices. Under closer scrutiny, realist critics
of liberal hegemony offer problematic international
order proposals, while they nonetheless identify ma-
jor problems in the liberal hegemonic order project.
From closer examination and consideration, that is,
these limitations of realist policy alternatives question
their ability to contribute to international order in the
twenty-first century and suggest, quite the opposite, that
if pursued they would instead become new sources of
international disorder, while nevertheless avoiding some
of the problems associated with liberal internationalism.
Realists may be unpersuaded by this critical assess-
ment of their foreign policy proposals because realists
accept as an assumption the picture of international re-
lations as they see it, a world where conflict and war
are to be avoided and mitigated but ultimately some-
thing to be expected. Conflict and war, as such, for real-
ists emerges in any international order, either as a mech-
anism of the balance of power or as failure of foreign
policy to heed its dictates. Yet, this position reveals the
limitations of their assumptions, which explains the lim-
itations of their policy prescriptions. That is, the source
of realists’ insistence on insufficient disorder generative
balance of power-ordering proposals is ultimately found
in their limited conception of the balance of power itself.
Because realists assume that order is contingent on the
balance of power, that is, they have limited appreciation
of the role of other ordering rules, norms, and institu-
tions, which limits the ordering proposals of realists to
only minimum rules, making them insufficient as interna-
tional order proposals. This is to say that realist theories
of order-making are reductive to the balance of power
and are thereby unduly modest, ultimately being limited
to the maintenance of the material balance of power and
a limited set of rules and norms, to the neglect of various
other essential means of order-making. To be clear, dif-
ferent schools of realists hold different conceptions of the
balance of power, but they nevertheless commonly hold
limited conceptions of it, limiting the range and depth
of their ordering proposals. Structural realists, such as
Mearsheimer, hold what Randall Schweller has described
as a “mechanical” or “automatic” theory of the bal-
ance of power, assuming that balancing behavior emerges
spontaneously in an anarchic structure (Schweller 2016).
Classical realists instead hold a “semi-automatic” theory,
assuming that balancing emerges in conditions of anar-
chy, but that it includes balancing by states that “hold the
balance,” lending their weight to the weaker side to main-
tain a balance. Regardless of these differences, however,
either realist conception restricts the balance of power to
material balancing and reduces international order to its
operation (Schweller 2001).
By contrast, alternative constructivist and English
School approaches for instance hold more comprehen-
sive conceptions of the balance of power, appreciating
both its material and social aspects (Clark 2011; Goh
2019).Thesemore comprehensive conceptions of the bal-
ance of power, for example, suggest alternative world or-
der strategies that seek negotiated bargains on different
and shifting balances of power, and legitimate and insti-
tutionalize different distributions of power while estab-
lishing shared and stabilizing expectations for its shifts
and legitimate use. These more ambitious approaches to
the management of the balance of power itself are more
policy-demanding, requiring consistent commitment and
greater diplomatic investment and effort from multiple
actors in policy formation and implementation. Yet, un-
like liberal internationalists but similar to realists, al-
ternative constructivist and English School international
order strategies also have the advantage of deliberately
avoiding andmitigating diplomatic tensions generated by
strong democracy and liberal human rights promotion
associated with liberal internationalism. Moreover, such
alternative international order strategies offered by con-
structivist and English School approaches may likely be-
come increasingly necessary, if the worst effects of purely
realist power politics are to be avoided too, as US power
declines.
Conclusion
Liberal internationalists and political realists have long
offered prominent contrasting perspectives on how to
produce order in international politics. Yet, there is a
sense that their strengths derive at least in part from each
other’s weaknesses and that neither is entirely compelling
on its own. Neither liberalism nor realism appears suffi-
cient when examined closely and each has a mixed track
record of successes and failures in international history.
Today, as the limitations of liberal internationalism have
become increasingly apparent, realists have enjoyed a re-
vival, leveling deep criticisms against liberal hegemony,
identifying it as the source of its own crisis. Yet, while re-
alist critics identify important problemswith liberal hege-
mony, under scrutiny the alternative foreign policies they
offer suffer from their own serious limitations. Realist
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avoid the problems realists associate with liberal inter-
ventionism, but would be generative of proxy wars,while
offering insufficient additional institutions, practices, and
norms for mitigating andmanaging proxy wars and great
power conflict, among other global international chal-
lenges. These limitations of realist policy alternatives sug-
gest that if pursued they would not produce a more sta-
ble international order, but instead would become new
sources of international disorder.
While this assessment of realist critiques of liberal
hegemony has concluded that alternative realist propos-
als suffer their own serious limitations, this assessment
has not established what international order strategies
states will adopt or what kind of international order will
emerge. As suggested in the discussion above, because the
Biden administration is developing a foreign policy re-
viving US-led liberal internationalism, albeit with impor-
tant modifications at home and abroad, realist critics will
likely continue to advance their critiques of liberal inter-
nationalism, illuminating some of its limitations in theory
and practice. Yet, without offering more promising alter-
native international order strategies of their own, they
will shed little light on the paths to constructing a more
inclusive and stable international order in the twenty-first
century.
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